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Effects of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy on hospitals competition under non-price regulation

Overview of attention for article published in International Journal for Equity in Health, November 2016
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Title
Effects of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy on hospitals competition under non-price regulation
Published in
International Journal for Equity in Health, November 2016
DOI 10.1186/s12939-016-0468-8
Pubmed ID
Authors

Chan Wang, Pu-yan Nie

Abstract

Poor medical care and high fees are two major problems in the world health care system. As a result, health care insurance system reform is a major issue in developing countries, such as China. Governments should take the effect of health care insurance system reform on the competition of hospitals into account when they practice a reform. This article aims to capture the influences of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy and the importance of medical quality to patients on hospitals competition under non-price regulation. We establish a three-stage duopoly model with quantity and quality competition. In the model, qualitative difference and asymmetric medical insurance subsidy among hospitals are considered. The government decides subsidy (or reimbursement) ratios in the first stage. Hospitals choose the quality in the second stage and then support the quantity in the third stage. We obtain our conclusions by mathematical model analyses and all the results are achieved by backward induction. The importance of medical quality to patients has stronger influence on the small hospital, while subsidy has greater effect on the large hospital. Meanwhile, the importance of medical quality to patients strengthens competition, but subsidy effect weakens it. Besides, subsidy ratios difference affects the relationship between subsidy and hospital competition. Furthermore, we capture the optimal reimbursement ratio based on social welfare maximization. More importantly, this paper finds that the higher management efficiency of the medical insurance investment funds is, the higher the best subsidy ratio is. This paper states that subsidy is a two-edged sword. On one hand, subsidy stimulates medical demand. On the other hand, subsidy raises price and inhibits hospital competition. Therefore, government must set an appropriate subsidy ratio difference between large and small hospitals to maximize the total social welfare. For a developing country with limited medical resources and great difference in hospitals such as China, adjusting the reimbursement ratios between different level hospitals and increasing medical quality are two reasonable methods for the sustainable development of its health system.

Mendeley readers

Mendeley readers

The data shown below were compiled from readership statistics for 32 Mendeley readers of this research output. Click here to see the associated Mendeley record.

Geographical breakdown

Country Count As %
Unknown 32 100%

Demographic breakdown

Readers by professional status Count As %
Researcher 5 16%
Student > Master 4 13%
Professor 3 9%
Student > Ph. D. Student 2 6%
Student > Bachelor 1 3%
Other 4 13%
Unknown 13 41%
Readers by discipline Count As %
Nursing and Health Professions 4 13%
Social Sciences 4 13%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance 3 9%
Medicine and Dentistry 3 9%
Business, Management and Accounting 2 6%
Other 1 3%
Unknown 15 47%